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identify general equilibrium treatment effects and social returns to R&D. The model yields
a restriction on the application equation that helps identify the parameters of the cost-of-
application function. The proposed estimation strategy is applied to project level data from
the granting process of R&D subsidies. We find that larger firms have higher marginal
profitability of R&D. Rates of return on R&D are high and their distribution skew. Agency
specific returns are non-monotonic in private returns. Project level spillovers are linear in
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It has been long recognized that R&D and the distribution of benefits generated by it are
crucial for economic growth. The endogenous growth literature has shown that markets
typically provide too little R&D and has singled out subsidies to R&D as the main policy
tool (e.g. Howitt 1999, Segerstrom 2000). R&D subsidies have also become ubiquitous in
practice. They are the second largest1 and fastest growing form of industrial aid in
developed countries (Nevo 1998); the U.S. has had several programs (Lerner 1999) and
currently spends $1.5 billion a year on one R&D subsidy program alone;2 and  the  EU
exempts R&D subsidies from its state aid rules. In Finland where our data originates, R&D
subsidies are the most important tool of innovation policy (Georghiu et al. 2003). Some
central questions concerning R&D remain however open. For example, there is no research
on how spillovers are related to the level of R&D at project level, and on whether subsidies
go to projects where (increases in) private and social returns are most highly positively
correlated nor is there much evidence on the joint distribution of private and social returns
to R&D. Further, we know surprisingly little about the programs that allocate R&D
subsidies. How do the public agencies running programs decide subsidy levels? How do
potential applicants decide whether or not to apply? What are the public agencies’ and the
applicants’ costs and benefits from the program, and how are they determined? To answer
these questions we advance a new method which builds on the well-established treatment
effects literature and the recent advances in structural industrial organization. Our empirical
application uses detailed project level data on R&D investments plans and project
characteristics, and R&D subsidy decisions by a government agency.
1 Largest being regional aid. Pretschker (1998) states that financial support schemes constitute the
predominant type of government policy towards industrial R&D.
2 The  Small  Business  Innovation  Research  Program,  SBIR:  “In  FY (fiscal  year)  2001,  [the  SBIR program]
produced 3,215 Phase I awards and 1,533 Phase II awards for approximately $1.5 billion dollars”.  Phase I is
the startup phase. Awards of up to $100,000 for approximately 6 months support exploration of the technical
merit  or  feasibility  of  an  idea  or  technology.  Phase  II  awards  of  up  to  $750,000,  for  as  many  as  2  years,
expand Phase I results. During this time, the R&D work is performed and the developer evaluates
commercialization potential. Only Phase I award winners are considered for Phase II. Quotation and
information are from http://www.sba.gov/sbir/indexwhatwedo.html, visited on January 21, 2004.
1The methods of the treatment effects literature have found surprisingly few applications
in industrial organization. Our objectives require construction and estimation of a structural
model of the application and selection process into a voluntary treatment program. The
institutional setting in our data differs however considerably from those usually studied in
the treatment effects literature. We therefore model a continuous, potentially
multidimensional, optimal treatment with outcome heterogeneity. The treatment outcome is
a function of the applicant's investment, which in turn is a function of the received
treatment.  The  model  takes  into  account  application  costs,  and  isolates  the  effects  of  the
treatment that are specific to the agency. In addition, the theoretical model yields a
restriction on the application equation that helps identify the parameters of the application
cost function. Central to the model is the specification and interpretation of unobserved (to
the econometrician) shocks. We obtain economic interpretation for the application equation
and all estimated parameters. Given our parameterization of the model, it also yields
estimation equations that bear close resemblance to those traditionally used in e.g. the
returns to education literature.
Under the assumption of a benevolent public agency, our model identifies general
equilibrium treatment  effects  and  social  returns  to  R&D.  As  our  data  come from a  small
economy, where a large part of high-technology production is exported, it is very likely
that most consumer surplus lies outside the economy. Therefore, if the agency maximizes
domestic welfare, the social R&D benefits are mostly technological spillovers to other
domestic firms. Whilst such spillovers do not necessarily correspond to global benefits
from R&D, they do have a high priority in the policy-making of countries that export a
large part of their high-technology production.
We find that the returns appropriated by the agency but not by the firm are non-
monotonic in private R&D returns when measured over projects. Spillovers are linear in
2R&D expenditures and positive in expectation for 97% of the firms in our sample. Private
rates of return are very high and their distribution skew, following earlier findings at least
since Griliches (1958). Larger firms and firms with higher value added current production
have higher marginal profitability of R&D. Moving an R&D project to a larger firm will
create a larger surplus that is not appropriated by the firm. Non-applicants’ projects
generate larger returns on investments, but applicants’ projects generate larger joint rates of
return on subsidies, defined as the sum of the applicant's and agency's benefits divided by
the subsidy. The public agency obtains a return of 9% on its subsidy program, and in
allocating the subsidies, the agency generally adheres to the publicly announced principles.
Our model allows us to identify application costs. We find that neglecting application
costs causes a significant upward bias of the order of 70-90 percentage points in estimated
joint  rates  of  return.  We  also  identify  a  potential  selection  problem  that  is  related  to  the
important role of unobservable R&D profitability and application cost shocks: A positive
shock to marginal profitability of R&D leads to an even larger positive shock to application
costs. Thus firms with more profitable inventions are less likely to apply, ceteris paribus,
due to higher opportunity costs of applying, creating a negative selection bias. This
contrasts with the received view of a potential upward bias in the estimated effect of
subsidies on R&D (e.g., Lerner 1999, Wallsten 2000). Finally, there is evidence that
previous contacts with the public agency may reduce application costs.
As has already become apparent, our paper incorporates ingredients from several
literatures. Methodologically we draw on structural industrial organization (surveyed by
Reiss and Wolak, 2004) and on the treatment effects (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith 1999, and Blundell and Costa-Dias 2002, for surveys) and structural labor supply
literatures (surveyed by Blundell and MaCurdy 1999), whereas our empirical application
relates to the literatures on innovation and the effects R&D subsidies. The existing
3literature on the effects of R&D subsidies is extensive but, unfortunately, characterized by
subtle points of inconclusive controversy (see David, Hall, and Toole 2000, and Klette,
Møen and Griliches 2000, for surveys), and methodologically mostly distinct from our
approach. Structural modeling has, however, turned out to be fruitful in many other areas of
innovation research; see, e.g., Pakes (1986) on patent value, Levin and Reiss (1988) on
cost-reducing and demand creating R&D, Lanjouw (1998) on patent value and litigation,
Eaton and Kortum (2002) on the role of trade in diffusing the benefits of new technology,
Jovanovic and Eeckhout (2002) on the impact of technological spillovers on the firm size
distribution, and Petrin (2002) on the welfare effects of new products. In the structural
industrial organization literature, Wolak (1994) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) are close
to ours methodologically. Our paper has also a link with the literature on revealed
bureaucrat preferences (McFadden 1975, 1976).
Recent examples of the structural treatment effects literature that have bearing on our
set-up, questions or methods include Keane and Moffitt's (1998) study of multiple welfare
programs, and Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Cameron and Taber (2004) who evaluate the
effects of tuition subsidies and borrowing constraints. Other papers in the treatment
program literature that have a close relation to ours are Heckman and Robb (1985),
Maddala (1983, ch. 9), Manski (2000), and Heckman and Smith (2004) who stress the
application and selection decisions and Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996) who study how
the  objectives  of  the  office  holders  affect  the  selection  decisions  (cf.  Heckman,  Heinrich
and Smith 1997). Willis and Rosen’s (1979) classic contribution on education is in many
ways close to ours. Prior to us, continuous treatment effects are theoretically modeled, e.g.,
by Heckman (1997). Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) generalize the standard discrete
4zero-one treatment model into models of multiple treatment levels.3 Heckman, Lochner and
Taber (1998) and Davidson and Woodbury (1993) suggest procedures to identify general
equilibrium treatment effects. Dehejia (2005), like us, models the selection decisions of the
public agency.
Advances in the research of R&D and R&D subsidies have been hampered by lack of
sufficient  data.  For  example,  the  established  but  unsettled  literature  on  the  R&D-size
relationship (see e.g. Cohen 1995) relies almost exclusively on firm level data. The only
paper we know that studies the granting and application side of R&D subsidies is Blanes
and Busom (2004). They estimate reduced form models of the joint application and
granting decision. Their main finding that firms even in the same industry have different
application thresholds both within and between the agencies supports our model and
results.
We have access to rich data from Tekes (the National Technology Agency of Finland),
the sole source of R&D subsidies in Finland. Finland provides a neat case for our study
because i) innovation policy has long been a central theme in government policy, ii) partly
because of successful policy, Finland has particularly rapidly transformed to a technology
intensive  economy  (see  e.g.  Trajtenberg  2001),  and  iii)  subsidies  and,  as  a  result,  Tekes,
constitute the main innovation policy tool. For example, there are no R&D tax benefits that
could jeopardize the policy analysis. The data contain all the subsidy applications, the
agency’s internal ratings of the applications and its decisions over a two- and half-year
period (Jan. 2000 – June 2002). The information on applications is matched to data on over
14 000 Finnish firms that constitute a large proportion of potential applicants.
As our method may be applied to other treatments, we present a generic version of our
treatment program model in Section II. We explain the institutional background and data in
3 Although Imbens (2000) does not explicitly further generalize his model, it is evident that it could also
5Section III. The generic model is then tailored to fit the institutional background in Section
IV. There we also explain identification and estimation. Econometric results are reported in
Section V, and implications of the model in Section VI. Conclusions are in Section VII.
II. The theoretical model
We want to model the following situation: There is a pool of potential applicants who have
projects that require costly investments. The applicants need to decide whether or not to
apply to a treatment program. A treatment lowers the marginal (shadow) cost of the
investment, and all agents know the effect of the treatment. The program is run by a public
agency whose utility function includes applicants’ utility as an argument. The agency
decides  what  treatment  to  give  to  each  actual  applicant,  subject  to  constraints.  For  the
moment,  we  do  not  allow  for  the  screening  and  evaluation  of  project  proposals  by  the
agency but consider them in Section IV.
The generic model of this section accommodates various interpretations. For example,
one can think of expected employment as a project.4 Our empirical application resembles
what  Jaffe  (2002)  calls  a  ‘canonical’  research  grant  program  as  our  applicants  are  firms,
they have R&D projects, the agency is Tekes (the National Technology Agency of Finland)
and a treatment is an R&D subsidy. We model the treatment program as a four-stage game
of imperfect information between the applicant and the agency. In stage zero, nature draws
the types of the players from a common knowledge prior distribution. In stage one, the
applicant  decides  whether  or  not  to  apply  to  the  program.  In  Section  IV,  we  allow  an
application to include a proposal for an investment level. In stage two, the agency decides
accommodate continuous treatments.
4According to Heckman and Smith (1995) the treatments offered by educational programs such as JTPA are
often also available to those who do not participate in the program. One could thus think of educational
programs reducing marginal costs of educational investment. The situation we model is also close to the one
in Roberts, Maddala and Enholm (1978) who study what determines whether a regulated firm requests a
review of its regulated rate of return.
6the level of treatment, s, sÎ[0,1). As will be specified below, the treatment level is subject
to minimum and maximum constraints if the application is accepted. The level is zero if
there is no application or the application is rejected. In stage three, after receiving the
treatment, the applicant makes the investment, R, ),0[ ¥ÎR .
We next introduce a set of assumptions some of which serve our objective of building a
structural econometric model instead of a pure theory model.
A.1. Both the agency’s and the applicant’s utility functions are continuous and everywhere
differentiable in their decision variables. The applicant’s utility function is concave.
A.2. The applicant’s type is common knowledge. The agency’s type is private information.
A.3. The treatment cannot be misused.
A.4. There are no constraints on applicant’s investment.
A.5. The agency’s budget constraint does not bind.
A.6. The applicant’s investment is non-contractible.
A.7. The level of treatment is ],[ ss , 10 <<£ ss .
A.8. All potential general equilibrium effects are captured by the agency’s utility function.
A.1. ensures that the model behaves nicely. In particular, the applicant’s best-reply to a
treatment in stage three will be unique and given by a function. Because the agency’s
utility function is rather complex, we do not assume its concavity but use A.1. in seeking
the conditions for a unique equilibrium of the game. The informational asymmetry in A.2.
regarding the players’ types generates (in line with our data) equilibrium outcomes where
the applicant applies for a treatment only to be turned down. By the agency’s type we mean
how it values the applicant’s project (see below), and A.2. amounts to assuming that the
applicant  does  not  know  exactly  the  benefit  the  agency  will  receive  from  the  project.  In
7practice, it may be neither desirable nor possible to make the agency fully transparent.5
A.3. excludes moral hazard problems in the use of a treatment.6 By A.4., the unique
solution to the applicant’s maximization problem in stage three is interior. This assumption
rules out credit rationing.7 A.5 is motivated by simplicity, but we do impose a cost of
financing on the agency.8 A.6. is more realistic as it prevents the applicant and the agency
from writing a binding contract specifying the amount the applicant invests conditional on
the treatment it receives. A.7. corresponds with our application, and leads to a rather
general way of modeling the treatment. A.8. is a weaker form of the standard, heavily
criticized (e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998), assumption in the treatment literature
that excludes general equilibrium effects. In principle the agency should be a benevolent
social planner that takes into account all effects of the treatment. If this is the case, our
model will identify general equilibrium treatment effects.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria where, in stage one, the applicant correctly
anticipates the type contingent strategies of the agency in stage two, and where the
5 The alternative and perhaps more standard assumption would reverse the informational asymmetry so that
the agency's type is common knowledge but the applicants’ type is private information. Although this would
also generate rejected applications, it would lead to signalling, unnecessarily complicating the analysis.
Moreover, the way we model the informational asymmetry is appealing in our empirical application because
of the centralized subsidy allocation. A problem with our approach is that the agency could in principle give
the optimal treatment without an application. Thus, we should strictly speaking assume that the applicant's
type becomes common knowledge only upon the application. In so far the applicant cannot signal her type the
assumption is inconsequential.
6 In practice, moral hazard temptations are certainly pervasive with monetary treatments, as in our
application. As a result, Tekes has several safe-guards against expropriation. For example, subsidies are only
paid against receipts, there is a euro limit to a subsidy, and a significant number of subsidized R&D projects
is annually randomly audited. Because the safe-guards are common knowledge, and the misuses found in the
audits or otherwise are rare, we think that the assumption depicts equilibrium behavior.
7 Although financial market failure has traditionally been a rationale for R&D subsidies, the revealed
motivations for R&D subsidies have become increasingly spillover-oriented. A study using Finnish data
(Hyytinen and Pajarinen 2003), and an evaluation of Finnish innovation policy (Georghiu et al. 2003)
conclude that only small, R&D intensive, growth-oriented firms may face financial constraints. As the
Finnish financial market is not particularly well developed, the same trend should be observed in many other
industrialized countries, as the survey by Hall (2002) confirms. The decline of the financial constraint
motivation for R&D subsidies is also reflected in our application: although Tekes also grants low-interest
loans, most firms were not interested in them. As the Finnish financial market is not particularly well
developed, the same trend is observed in many other industrialized countries, as the survey by Hall (2002)
confirms.
8 This is admittedly a strong assumption and we plan to take the agency budget constraint into account in
future work.
8applicant’s and agency’s strategies are sequentially rational. In this extensive form game
the applicant’s posterior belief concerning the agency’s type is immaterial so there is no
need to specify the belief formation. As a result, we can solve the game by backward
induction, starting from the applicant’s maximization problem in stage three. The applicant
chooses the level of investment, R, ),0[ ¥ÎR  to maximize
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )RsRsR --=P 1, p .
The first term in (1), ?(R), with 0)0( =p , captures the applicant's expected discounted
private utility from the project, net of investment costs. Equation (1) shows how we restrict
the treatment s to  be  the  share  of  the  investment  cost  covered  by  the  agency.9 With this
formulation, A.1 implies that ?(R) is concave. The first-order condition ¶p/¶R = 1-s gives
us R*(s), the applicant's best-reply function.
In stage two, the agency chooses the treatment s, ],[ sss Î , to maximize its expected
discounted utility conditional on its type
(2) U(R(s),s) = V(R*(s), h )+ P(R*(s),s) – gsR*(s) – F.
In (2), g (g>1) is the constant opportunity cost of agency resources, e.g., the opportunity
cost of tax funds, and F is the sum of the applicant’s fixed cost of applying and the
agency’s fixed cost of processing the application. The applicant’s utility directly enters the
agency’s utility function and it has an equal weight to V().
The interpretation of V()  is  fundamental  to  our  analysis.  It  captures  the  effects  of  the
applicant’s investment on the agency beyond the applicant’s utility and the direct costs of
treatment and the application process. Examples are externalities from firm R&D or from
individual investments in human capital, and program-mandated payments to the agency
9 The generalization to the case where the treatment also has an effect on ? is straightforward but we believe
the formulation given by (1) is not only simple but fairly general. For example, in a social program such as
JTPA, the treatment might reduce costs of attending an educational course (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith,
1995). Heckman and Smith (1995) explain how JTPA directs the participants of the program to take courses
9(such as in JTPA). At the level of individual decision makers V() can include idiosyncratic
benefits from giving a certain treatment such as direct bribes or indirect ones, e.g., through
a  revolving  door  mechanism.  In  principle,  such  effects  of  the  applicant’s  investment  can
also be negative or decreasing in the investment level. In what follows, we call V() agency
specific utility. The agency’s type is given by h , which has a common knowledge
probability density function )(hf  and cumulative probability density function )(hF . In our
application, h  reflects the benefits from the R&D project which the agency appropriates,
but which are unobserved by the applicant. It is quite natural to think that the applicant is
uncertain, e.g., about the agency’s expectation of the extent of spillovers or consumer
surplus created by its project.
Because the agency is assumed to be subject to minimum and maximum constraints in
choosing the treatment level (A.7), we form the Lagrangean
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )ssssssRUsL ----º 2121 )),(*(,, llll
and by using (2) write out the first order conditions:
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¶
P¶  in (4a) is zero by the envelope theorem. As a result, the agency only
needs to know the applicant’s reaction function.10 Although the informational requirements
that are available also to non-participants with higher tuition fees. By lowering the cost of taking in a course,
the program participants may choose more courses than identical non-participants.
10 Given this knowledge the agency can infer the applicant’s utility function up to the constant of integration.
In our application, the constant equals the discounted expected profits from all other activities of the
applicant, bar the R&D project for which the firm sought subsidies.
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can sound challenging, we explain later how they are often less demanding than seems
from the outset.
We are left with four effects of the treatment on the agency. The first effect is indirect
through V(), the second and the third are direct and indirect cost effects on the agency and
the fourth is a direct cost effect on the applicant. An interior solution to (4a) is thus given
by s*(h) that solves ( ) 0)(*1* =-+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
¶
¶ sRggs
R
V
ds
dR . Note that since ¶2P/¶R¶s is
positive,  the  treatment  and  the  applicant's  investments  are  complements  and,  as  a  result,
dR*/ds>0. Thus, as g>1, we can have an interior solution only if the applicant's investment
generates sufficiently large agency specific benefits, e.g., positive externalities. In other
words, if the applicant's investment decreases V(), the optimal treatment level is minimal.11
To characterize the application decision, we assume that ¶2V/¶R¶h>0 and that this is
common knowledge. The applicant can then calculate the expected treatment to be
(5) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]sdsssE hhhfhh h
h
F-++F= ò 1* ,
where h and h  denote the values of h at which the minimum and maximum treatment
constraints begin to bind and where s*(h) is an interior solution to (4a).
In stage one, the applicant decides to apply if the expected utility from applying is at
least as large as that from not applying. Because the expected utility from not applying is
P(R*(0),0) the applicant's decision rule can be written as
(6)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )0,0*,*1*,**,* RKssRdssRssR P³-PF-+P+PF ò hhhfhhh
h
h
,
where K is the strictly positive cost of applying.
11 If the treatment had an effect on the applicant beyond the cost reduction, ¶2P/¶R¶s could be negative, i.e.,
the treatment and the applicant's investments could be substitutes. In such a case, even non-minimal
treatments could be justified if the applicant's investment were harmful from the agency's point of view.
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We now specify the conditions for the agency’s utility function that guarantee a
unique equilibrium. Let us define
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PROPOSITION. If f(s*(h))<0, there is a unique equilibrium characterized by the
application rule (6), the optimal treatment level s for h£h, s*(h) for hÎ(h,h ) and s  for
h³h , and the applicant’s investment rule R*(s).
Proof: In stage three, the applicant has a well-defined best-reply function R*(s) because of
A.1. In stage two, the agency maximizes its expected utility conditional on its type. There
is a unique type-contingent optimal treatment if the second order condition for the
Lagrangean (3) holds. Since we have linear constrains, it suffices to show that U(R*(s), s)
is concave when evaluated at s*(h).  Differentiating  (2)  twice,  we  see  that U(R*(s), s) is
concave if 02 2
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Using  the  envelope  theorem  (¶P/¶R=0) and (1) leaves us f(s). If f(s*(h))<0, there is a
unique maximum that solves (4a-c). Since we assume that ¶2V/¶R¶h>0, the optimal
treatment level is increasing in h. Therefore the optimal type-contingent treatment is s for
h£h, s*(h) for hÎ(h,h ) and s  for h³h . As a result, the applicant correctly anticipates
that the expected treatment is given by (5) and makes the application decision according to
(6). Because the type-contingent action of the agency in stage two is unique, the left-hand
side of (6) has a unique value. In stage one the applicant either applies or does not apply,
and there is thus a unique utility maximizing action in each stage of the game. QED.
It is rather hard to characterize when f(s*(h))<0 without specifying functional forms. In
our econometric specification, f(s*(h))<0. Note that f(s*(h))<0  is  only  a  sufficient
condition for a unique equilibrium. For example, if f(s*(h))>0, we also have a unique
12
equilibrium where the optimal treatment level is always either the minimum or the
maximum treatment and accordingly, the applicant’s investment is always either R(s) or
R( s ). Given her knowledge of the agency type distribution, the applicant can again
calculate the expected treatment and make optimal application decision using a rule similar
to (6).
III. Finnish innovation policy, Tekes and data12
A. Innovation policy and Tekes
In 2001 Finland invested 3.6 per cent of GDP – 5 billion euros - on R&D. Tekes is the
principal public financier of private R&D in Finland.13 The primary objective of Tekes is to
promote the competitiveness of Finnish industry and the service sector by providing
funding and advice to both business and public R&D. To achieve these goals, Tekes strives
to increase Finnish firms’ R&D and risk-taking. In addition to the primary criteria, Tekes
has an explicit regional policy objective. Finnish regions differ greatly in their socio-
economic characters, economic performance, and their R&D-intensity, e.g., some 20% of
the population lives in the capital region in Southern Finland where also most economic
activity and R&D takes place. As will be specified later, Tekes also treats firms fulfilling
the official SME criterion differently.
Besides funding business R&D, Tekes finances feasibility studies, and R&D by public
sector including scientific research. In 2001 Tekes funding amounted to 387 million euros,
and it received 2948 applications of which almost exactly 2/3 were accepted. The number
of applications by the business sector for R&D funding was 1357 and, again, 2/3 of them
12 As our application data is from Jan. 2000- June 2002, we use 2001 figures to describe the environment.
One of us spent six months in Tekes to get acquainted with the actual decision making process. Public
information about Tekes can be found at http://www.tekes.fi/eng/, accessed December 20th, 2004.
13 Main public funding organizations in the Finnish innovation system in addition to Tekes are the Academy
of Finland, Employment and Economic Development Centers (T&E Centers), Finnvera,  Industry Investment
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were accepted. In monetary terms, the business sector applied for 526 million euros while
211 million euros were granted to it.
Business R&D funding consists of grants, low-interest loans and capital loans. Tekes’
low-interest loans not only have an interest rate below the market rate but they are also
soft:  If  the project turns out to be a commercial  failure,  the loan may not have to be paid
back. A capital loan granted by Tekes differs from the standard private sector debt
contract in various ways: it is included in fixed assets in the balance sheet, it can be paid off
only when unrestricted shareholders’ equity is positive and the debtor cannot give collateral
for the loan. The share of each instrument of the total funding allocated to business R&D in
2001 was 69 %, 18% and 13 %. Subsidy applications covered 83 % of the amount applied
whereas in terms of granted amount subsidies’ share was 67%. The overlook of loans by
applicants suggests that they do not encounter significant financial constrains, supporting
our assumption A.4 (cf. footnote 7).
The application process from the submission to the final decision, which to our
understanding is well known among potential applicants, proceeds along the lines of the
theory  model  of  Section  II.  There  are,  however,  two  details  that  are  not  captured  by  the
model. First, an application has to include the purpose and the budget of the R&D project
for which Tekes funding is needed, and the applied amount of funding in euros. Second,
Tekes screens the application and grades it in several dimensions by using a 6-point Likert
scale from 0-5. According to Tekes civil servants, the most important dimensions in project
evaluation concern the technological challenge of the project and its market risk.14 Tekes’
public decision criteria are: The project’s effect on the competitiveness of the applicant, the
and Sitra. Also the Foundation of Finnish Inventions (Innofin) provides financial support for innovation. See
Georghiu et al. (2003) for a recent description and evaluation of the Finnish innovation policy institutions.
14 A loose translation of grades of technological challenge is 0 = ‘no technical challenge’, 1 = ‘technological
novelty only for the applicant’, 2 =’ technological novelty for the network or the region’, 3 = ‘national state-
of-the-art’, 4 = ‘demanding international level’, and 5 = ‘ international state-of-the-art’. For market risk, it is 0
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technology to be developed, the resources reserved for the project, the collaboration with
other  firms  within  the  project,  societal  benefits,  and  the  effect  of  Tekes'  funding.  As
mentioned above, Tekes also has an explicit regional policy objective and it takes into
account whether the application comes from an SME.
Tekes’ final decision is based on the proposed budget of the project before the R&D
investments are made, but the actual funding is only given ex post against the incurred
costs. Decision making is constrained by the rules preventing negative subsidies and very
large subsidies both in relative and absolute terms. In other words, a subsidy is granted ex
ante as a share of to-be-incurred R&D costs. There is an upper bound for this share: If the
firm fulfils the EU SME criterion, the upper bound is 0.6, otherwise 0.5.15 The actual
funding then covers the promised share of incurred costs up to a specified euro limit. The
limit should allow the promised reimbursement of investment costs up to the profit
maximizing level but prevent Tekes from covering costs extraneous to the project
proposal.16 In terms of our model, these practices amount to s =0, }6.0,5.0{Îs and a goal
of setting the euro limit at sR*(s).
Tekes also sometimes adjusts a proposed budget, both down and up, when an applicant,
e.g., applies subsidies for costs that Tekes cannot cover. In practice an upward adjustment
is rare and in principle occurs only if a project significantly changes character during the
= ‘no identifiable risk’, 1 = ‘small risk’, 2 = ‘considerable risk’, 3 = ‘big risk’, 4 = ‘very big risk’, and 5 =
‘unbearable risk’.
15 Given our data, it is unlikely that firms deliberately keep themselves below the EU SME boundary
requiring that a firm has less than 250 employees and has either sales less than 40 million euros or the balance
sheet less than 27 million euros. Most of the firms in our data are well below the boundary, as 95% them have
less than 110 employees, less than 14 million euros in sales, and a balance sheet of less than 11 million. As
the SME criterion also maintains that large firms can hold at most 25% of a SME’s equity and votes, it is
unlikely that many of the SMEs are subsidiaries of large firms. We thus consider the SME status of a firm
exogenous.
16 As mentioned in footnote 6, the euro limit alleviates the moral hazard problem. There are also other reasons
for the limit. Because Tekes has an annual operating budget, a practical decision rule is to cap the euro
amount using the proposed budget, as it is the best available information at the time the subsidy decision is
made. Tekes is also monitored both by the press and politicians. Tekes civil servants may want avoid the
accusations of granting larger subsidies than originally planned. At the same time, however, there may be a
desire to make the limit high enough to allow profit maximizing behavior of applicants.
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application process. Such upgrades can thus be taken as exogenous events that cannot be
manipulated by Tekes to overcome the institutional limits on its subsidy allocation. We use
this measure, which we call the ‘accepted proposed investment’, as our dependent variable
in the R&D equation. We test the robustness of our results by using the R&D investment
proposed by the applicant as an alternative dependent variable.
B. Data
Our data come from two sources. The project level data come from Tekes, containing all
applications to Tekes from January 1st 2000 to June 30th 2002. They consist of detailed
information on the project proposals and Tekes' decisions. The firm level data covering
originally 14 657 Finnish firms come from Asiakastieto Ltd, which is a for-profit company
collecting, standardizing, and selling firm specific quantitative information.17
Asiakastieto’s data are based on public registers, for example, firms’ official profit sheet
and  balance  sheet  statements,  and  include  all  the  firms  who  file  their  data  in  the  public
register. We use the 1999 cross section, i.e., all firm characteristics are recorded earlier than
the application data. The sample was drawn from Asiakastieto’s registers according to three
criteria: i) the most recent financial statement of the firm in the register is either from 2000
or 2001; ii) the firm is a corporation; and iii) the industrial classification of the firm is
manufacturing, ICT, research and development, architectural and engineering and related
technical consultancy, or technical testing and analysis. Firms in these industries are most
likely to apply for funding from Tekes. After cleaning the data of firms with missing
values, we are left with 10 944 firms. These firms form a large proportion of the population
of potential applicants, and they constitute our sample of potential applicants.
Some 1000 firms from outside our sample filed applications to Tekes during the
observation period. There are three principal reasons for the exclusion of an applicant from
16
our sample: 1) the firm did not exist in 1999; 2) the firm did not operate in the industries
from which the sample was formed; and 3) the firm was so small that it was not obliged by
law to send its balance and profit sheets to the official registry.
The data we use in the estimations comprises 915 applications, where we have limited
the count to one per firm by using the first application by each firm within our observation
period. 18 722 of these applications were accepted, i.e., received a positive subsidy share.
Table 1 displays summary statistics of our explanatory variables for potential applicants,
and Table 2 conditions the statistics on the application decision and success. As Table 1
shows, potential applicants are heterogenous. They are on average 12 years old with 35
employees.  A  very  high  proportion  are  SMEs  according  to  the  official  EU  standard  (cf.
footnote 16). As explained, the SME criterion determines the upper bound of the share of
the R&D costs covered by Tekes, and we therefore need to take it into account in our
estimations. Sales per employee, a measure of value added, is 165 000 euros. Some 6% are
exporters with no domestic sales. We use this indicator, as the firms that exclusively export
should generate no domestic consumer surplus, implying that the agency specific utility
should largely consist of spillovers to other domestic firms. 19
[TABLE 1 HERE]
We also have information on two corporate governance variables. In some 14% of
potential applicants, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Such an arrangement can,
on the one hand, improve the information flow between the board and the executive but, on
the other hand, weakens the board’s independence. The board of an average potential
applicant has four to five members. A larger board is costlier but is more likely to include
17 More information about Asiakastieto can be found at http://www.asiakastieto.fi/en/, accessed June 20th,
2005.
18 Several firms in our data had multiple applications during our observation period. The firms in our sample
roughly account for half of all applications.
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members with outside knowledge that may be useful either in conducting R&D (choosing
among competing projects, organizing management of current projects, monitoring), or in
the application process itself.
From Table 2 we see that applicants are larger than non-applicants and successful
applicants larger than rejected ones. The median number of employees for non-applicants is
5, for applicants 26, and for rejected applicants 21. The applicants also tend to have larger
boards. Quite naturally, applicants have more previous applications on average than non-
applicants. The difference in both means and medians is 4.
Table 3 reports information about applications and Tekes' decisions. Some 21% of
applications are rejected. The proposed projects involve on average an investment of 630
000 euros; the rejected proposals are clearly smaller with a mean of 385 000 euros.
According to Tekes’ rating, the projects have on average a technical challenge of 2 (scale
0-5), and rejected proposals have on average a lower score of 1.5. The mean risk score is
also 2, and it is the same for successful and rejected applications (see the Appendix for
more information).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
As explained, Tekes grants low-interest and capital loans besides subsidies. Because it
is hard to calculate the value of such non-standard loans to the applicants, we pool the
instruments. We thus define the subsidy per cent as the sum of all three forms of financing,
divided by accepted proposed investment. As some 60% of applicants only apply for a
subsidy, and over 80% are only granted a subsidy, this seems a reasonable simplification.
Measuring a subsidy in this way, only 0.4% of applicants get the maximum subsidy.20
19 We have repeated our estimations by including in the “exporter” category all firms that report exports
regardless of whether they have domestic sales or not. The results are qualitatively identical, and
quantitatively close to those reported.
20 There is a cluster of firms right below the maximum subsidy: 1.9% of applicants get a subsidy which is less
than one percentage point below the maximum subsidy, and 2.5% get a subsidy less than 5 percentage points
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Successful applicants receive on average a subsidy that covers 32% of the R&D investment
costs. We test the robustness of our results to the definition of a subsidy by using only pure
subsidies as the dependent variable in the Tekes decision rule.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
IV. The econometric model
A. The operationalization of the econometric model
We now operationalize the model by tailoring it to correspond to institutional details of our
application explained and by making assumptions on functional forms and unobservables.
We approximate the screening process by assuming that Tekes grades each proposed
project in two dimensions on a Likert scale of 5 and that this is common knowledge.21 The
resulting 25 grade combinations are modeled by a latent regression framework. We assume
that the error terms are normally distributed and uncorrelated both with each other and
other unobservables of the model. Denoting the latent value of grading dimension jÎ{c, m}
for application i by *ijw  and the observed value by wij, we get:
hwij =  if hjijiijh Tw mwzm £+=<-
*
1
(7) h = 1,…,5, -¥®0m , 11 =m , 22 =m ,…, ¥®5m
ijw ~ N(0, 1), 0),cov( =imic ww ,
where c stands for technological challenge, m for market risk, iT  is a vector of observable
characteristics of applicants, jz  is parameter vector to be estimated, and jiw  are the
unobservable applicant-specific components. Equation (7), when applied to the two
below the maximum. At the lower end there is no such clustering: on the contrary, no firm gets a subsidy that
is less than 2.9%: however, 2.6% of applicants get a subsidy that is greater than 2.9% and less than 5% .
21 As explained in the previous section, Tekes in principle uses 6-point Likert scale from 0-5. However, since
no applicant is assigned to category 5 in the market risk dimension, and only handful of applicants is assigned
to category 0 in the technological risk dimension, we merge these categories with the ones next to them.
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evaluation dimensions, produces the probabilities of each of the 25 different outcome
combinations. The application decision is then amended to
(6’)
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where ctp  and
m
kp  denote the probabilities of getting grades t and k in the dimensions of
technological challenge and market risk.
We specify applicant i’s objective function as
(8) iiiiiiiiii RsRXXsR )1(ln)exp(),,,( 0 --++=P ebpe ,
where, in line with (1), is  is the treatment and iR  is the investment. The marginal
productivity of the investment is affected by observable applicant characteristics iX , by
vector ? of parameters to be estimated and by ie , a random shock, distributed by nature,
uncorrelated with the observable applicant characteristics, observed by the firm, and
unobserved by the econometrician. The reservation value including other projects is
embodied in 0ip .
Equation (8) introduces unobservables into the applicant's objective function in an
economically meaningful way.22 However,  this  creates  possibility  that  an  optimal
investment leads to a negative profit. In such a case the applicant prefers not to invest after
receiving a subsidy, which may distort the application decision. Because the possibility
arises only if both is  and ie  are sufficiently small, and because there is a way out of this
22 We could also generalize (8) to multiple projects. For each firm with multiple project applications, we
could treat each project as a separate observation. If the project-specific unobservables are uncorrelated, this
will not materially affect estimation. The interpretation for non-applicants would be that none of their projects
resulted in an application.
20
complication at the cost of a slight discontinuity at Ri=0, we ignore this possibility in what
follows.23
We assume that the agency’s utility form project i is given by
(9) iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii FRgsssRXsRZVZXsRU --P+= )),(,,())(,,(),,,,,( ehhe ,
where, similarly to (2), Fi is the sum of the fixed costs of applying and processing the
application, g is the constant opportunity cost of the agency’s resources, V(.)  is  the
expected agency specific utility from the project, and ih  is  the  random  shock  to  it  from
project i. In  line  with  the  theoretical  model  the  shock  is  assumed  to  be  distributed  by
nature, uncorrelated with applicant characteristics, observed by the agency, and unobserved
by the applicant and the econometrician. Compared to (2) and (8), the new term in (9) is
iZ , a vector of observable applicant characteristics that affect the agency specific utility
from the project. It may contain the same elements as iX .
We solve the model backwards as in Section II. In stage three, the applicant optimizes
(8) with respect to investment Ri. This yields
(10) lnRi = Xib-ln(1-si)+ei.
In stage two, the agency chooses a subsidy to maximize (9), taking (10) into account.
To arrive at an estimable model we therefore need to specify the effect of Ri on V(.). In the
theoretical model we formalized A.2. by assuming that ¶V/¶R = E[¶V/¶R]+h.  We  now
further assume that E[¶V/¶Ri] = Zid  where d is a vector of parameters to be estimated. As a
result,
23 The way out utilizes the facts that, without subsidies, the optimal investment is )exp( iiXiR eb +=  and that
xxx -ln  is a convex function with a unique minimum of -1 at x = 1. Introducing a small discontinuity at
Ri=0 into the applicant's utility function by means of the indicator function 1(R>0) would ensure that an
applicant always invests a positive amount, and that the increase in (expected) utility from investing is
nonnegative. This change in the utility function would yield the application  rule (6') after subtracting one
(euro) from the constant to get the true constant of the application cost function. The corrected decision rule
could be estimated using a simulation estimator. Our estimates show that negative profits from investment in
the case of not applying are extremely unlikely (of the order 10-22).
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(11) ¶V/¶Ri = Zid+hi.
A convenient implication of (11) is that
(12) V = (Zid+hi)Ri+constant.
Equation (12) permits that the effect of the applicant’s investment that is agency specific
can be decreasing in the level of investment. For example, it is possible that some R&D
projects exhibit negative externalities while being privately profitable. Equation (12)
considerably facilitates dealing with double-censoring and sample selection. Moreover, it
reduces the informational requirements for implementation of optimal subsidy decisions,
since the agency needs to know nothing about the applicant’s objective function. However,
the remaining informational requirements, in particular the fact that the agency should
know V(),  may  still  be  challenging  in  practice.  Another  implication  of  (12)  is  that V() is
proportional to R&D investment. This may be unrealistic but similar assumptions are
common in the literature: We test this assumption below and do not reject it.
By using (8), (10) and (11), the agency’s unconstrained decision rule can be written as
(13) si = 1-g+Zid+hi.
As a result, the probability that an applicant gets the minimum subsidy is F(s+g-1-Zid) and
the probability of getting the maximum subsidy is 1-F( s +g-1-Zid).
As to stage one, the applicant decides whether or not to apply according to (6’). We
specify the fixed costs of applying as
(14) Ki = exp (Yiq+ui)
where Yi is a vector of observable applicant characteristics, q is a vector of parameters to be
estimated and ui is a random cost shock, distributed by nature, uncorrelated with observable
applicant characteristics, observed by the firm, and unobserved by the econometrician.
By using (8), (10) and (14) and the fact that s =  0  as  explained  in  Section  III,  the
application rule can be derived from (6’) after some algebra
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In words, the application rule is given by an indicator function di that  takes  value  one  if
firm i finds it profitable to apply for a subsidy. Our econometric model can thus be
summarized by the application equation (6''), the screening equations (7), the Tekes
decision rule
(13’) iii Zgs hd ++-= )1(
* ,
with observations 0=ii sd  if 0
* £is  and ssd ii =  if ssi ³
* , and the applicant's decision
rule, i.e., the investment equation
(10’) iii sXR eb +--= )1ln(ln
* ,
with observation *lnln iii RdR = .
B. Statistical assumptions, identification and estimation
We  now  explain  our  statistical  assumptions,  how  identification  takes  place,  and  how  we
estimate the model. Our econometric model contains five unobservables, jw , e, h and u .
They are assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed applicant characteristics.
Estimating the model without imposing restrictions on the covariation of the unobservables
is in principle possible by using a simulation estimator. However, assuming that e and h are
uncorrelated yields a large reduction in computational cost, as then the Tekes decision rule
(13’) is no longer subject to a selection problem. This means that estimation can be broken
into three steps. Since our tests (see below) indicate that we cannot reject the Null of no
correlation between e and h , in estimating the model by ML, we impose
A.9 a) 0)1( nern ++= , b) eh ^ , c) 0nh ^ , d) 0ne ^ , e) ew ^j  f) hw ^j  g)
0uw ^j  h) h ~ N(0,
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In words, the unobservable (h) affecting the agency specific utility is uncorrelated both
with the unobservable (e) affecting the marginal profitability of the applicant’s investment
and with the unobservable (u) affecting the application cost. The screening equation
unobservables ( jw ) are uncorrelated with all other shocks. As A.9a) shows, there is no
restriction on the correlation between u and e.  A.9h)-j) may be relaxed when we use semi-
parametric estimation methods.
The  first  step  is  the  estimation  of  the  ordered  probit  the  screening  equations  (7).  By
using the estimates we can calculate the expected probability that a submitted application
gets  a  particular  grade  in  the  two  evaluation  dimensions.  Our  assumption  that  the
unobservables are normally distributed allows us to identify the coefficients up to scale.
The second step is to estimate the Tekes decision rule (13’). In estimation we use the
actual values for the grades from the evaluation of each project. The Tekes decision rule
identifies d, i.e., the effect of observed applicant and project characteristics on the agency
specific utility derived from the project. If we impose A.9b) and A.9c), we can estimate
(13’) using a double-hurdle Tobit model without correcting for selection. To test whether
A.9b) and c) hold, we estimate a sample selection double-hurdle Tobit and test for the
significance of the Mills ratio term. We also use an alternative, more flexible, approach of
nonparametrically estimating (13’) by a two-limit version of Powell’s (1984) CLAD
estimator.
After estimating the agency’s screening equation and its decision rule, we calculate the
effect of subsidies on the applicant's expected profits, replacing the unobservable parts in
the  application  equation  (6’’)  with  their  estimated  counterparts.  In  step  three  we  then
estimate the application and investment equations ((6'') and (10')) by using both ML and a
semi-parametric variant of the approach suggested by Das, Newey, and Vella (2003,
24
henceforth DNV).24 The application equation (6’’) allows us to identify how observed
applicant characteristics affect the fixed costs of application without having to resort to an
exclusion restriction. Our theoretical model suggests a form for the error term in the
application equation and, as a result, we identify the correlation between in and ie when
using ML. There is no need for a variance normalization as long as we, following theory,
constrain the coefficient of the summand
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to unity.25
Our model implies that the applicant’s best-reply function, Ri*(si), is increasing in
treatment and is heterogenous both with respect to observables and the unobservable
profitability shock. Another implication of the model is that an applicant strictly prefers
proposing a budget based on a maximum subsidy per cent over proposing any smaller
amount, and is indifferent between proposing that budget and any larger amount.26
Consequently, we can use the data on proposed budgets to estimate the investment equation
(10’) where we have inserted s  into the equation. Correcting for selection bias by using the
application equation (6’’), we obtain consistent estimates of b that determine the effect of
the observable applicant characteristics on the marginal profitability of the R&D-
investment. To obtain consistent standard errors in the application and investment
24 Manski  (1989)  compares  relative  merits  of  the  two  approaches.  Manski  argues  that,  although  the
nonparametric approach appears to be more flexible, it involves arbitrary exclusion restrictions. Therefore it
is not necessarily preferable over the parametric approach. Here theory comes to our aid, as it suggests an
exclusion restriction that can be utilized both in parametric and nonparametric estimation.
25 This implication of our theoretical model cannot be tested. If we imposed the standard variance
normalization, the coefficient of the term would be us/1  instead of unity.
26 Too  see  this,  recall  first  that  the  applicant  does  not  know  Tekes'  type  (A.2)  and  the  subsidy  share  is
bounded above at s  (A.7). As mentioned in Section IIIA, there is also an euro limit to the ex post
reimbursements which is based on the proposed budget. Then, since ¶?/¶s>0 by (8), the applicant wants as
high a subsidy as possible. Therefore it proposes an optimal project based on the maximum subsidy share,
R*( s ). Proposing anything less risks foregoing profits in case where the actual subsidy turns out to be larger
and the applicant subsequently reoptimizes because of the euro limit. On the other hand, the applicant would
never want to implement a project larger than R*( s ), and it is indifferent between announcing R*( s ) and
any larger budget, given the assumption that it cannot misappropriate the funds.
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equations, we bootstrap the whole model ((6’’), (7), (10’) and (13’)) when using both ML
and the semi-parametric estimator.
Note also what we cannot identify. In (8) we are unable to identify 0ip , the applicant's
reservation value, from the constant in Xi. Our cross section estimates are however not
affected by unobserved differences in the reservation value. Similarly, in (13') we cannot
identify separately g, the opportunity cost of government funds, and the constant in d. Nor
can we identify V(), as (13’) cannot be integrated to a unique number. Welfare analysis is
nonetheless possible, because our functional form assumptions ensure that all projects will
be carried out irrespective of the subsidy decision. Thus each project will produce the fixed
component in V()  regardless  of  whether  it  is  subsidized  or  not. 27 We  are  also  unable  to
identify the agency’s screening costs (Fi-Ki). This will result in an upward bias in the
welfare calculations if these costs are significant. Finally, in the semi-parametric estimation
of the selection and investment equations, the parameters of the application cost function
cannot be identified.
V. Estimation results
We include the following firm characteristics into all estimation equations: age, the log of
the  number  of  employees,  sales  per  employee,  an  SME  dummy,  a  dummy  for  a  parent
company, the number of previous applications, a dummy indicating if the CEO acts as the
chairman of the board, board size, and a dummy for exporters. We also include industry
and region dummies.28 In the reported specifications, we use a slightly different set of
explanatory variables in the screening equations and the Tekes decision rule on the one
27 This is strictly speaking not true given the application rule suggested by theory. It, however, holds in the
data, and would hold in the model if we introduced a discontinuity into the applicant's utility function as
discussed in footnote 23.
28 We divide Finland into five regions: Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern and Central Finland. Of these,
Eastern and Northern Finland are the least developed. We did try interactions between firm characteristics
and industry and region dummies.
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hand, and the selection and investment equations on the other. For example, we include the
squares of the continuous variables only when reporting the estimations of the investment
and application equations.29 The  results  from  the  screening  equations  are  reported  in  the
Appendix. We also have estimated the model (by ML) excluding the observations in the
99th size (sales) percentile, with essentially identical results to those reported. Other
robustness checks will be taken up in the context of the appropriate estimation.
A. The Tekes decision rule and agency specific benefits
In Table 4 we report the estimation results concerning Tekes’ decision rule. Recall that the
coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects of R&D on agency specific benefits.
By using ML (column one) we find that the more challenging a project is technically, the
higher  is  its  subsidy  rate.  A  one  point  increase  on  the  5-point  Likert  scale  leads  to  a  10
percentage point increase in the subsidy rate. Market risk carries a negative but
insignificant (p-value 0.13) coefficient. Firm size obtains a positive and significant (at 10%
level) coefficient. A possible interpretation is that in Tekes’ view, moving an otherwise
identical R&D project into a larger firm creates larger positive externalities, e.g., through
higher employee rents. As against Tekes' stated preference that allows a 10 percentage
points higher level of maximum subsidy for SMEs, it is unsurprising that SMEs are granted
a higher subsidy, everything else equal: The difference is 8.5 percentage points. The
corporate governance variables and the number of previous applications have no effect.
We relegate  the  details  of  the  coefficients  of  industry  dummies  to  the  Appendix.  The
only industry dummies with significant coefficients are food (p-value .000) and data
processing (p-value .081). Using metal manufacturing firms as a reference group, firms in
the food industry received a substantially higher subsidy, of the order of 25 percentage
points, whereas data processing firms obtained subsidies that were 6.5 percentage points
29 To speed up the computation of the bootstrap we used LR-tests to narrow the set of explanatory variables in
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lower. During our observation period, Tekes was actively seeking applications from the
food industry, which at least partially explains the findings concerning the industry.
Another finding left to the Appendix is that regional aspects seem to influence Tekes'
decision making: Firms in Eastern and Central Finland obtain subsidies that are 7-10
percentage points higher than they would obtain if they were in Southern Finland. That
regional policy matters is, however, debatable, as the city of Oulu, which is located in
Central Finland is one of the R&D centers in Finland. Moreover, we find that firms in the
depressed and sparsely populated Northern Finland do not get higher subsidies. This
finding is perhaps not robust as only 2% of our sample firms come from Northern Finland.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The above results are obtained under the assumptions A.9b) and A.9c), which maintain
that the error in the Tekes decision rule uncorrelated with the errors in the investment and
selection equations. To test these assumptions, we ran a first stage probit selection
equation30 and re-estimated the Tekes decision rule by inserting the Mills ratio into it. The
Mills ratio obtained small negative (less than 0.2 in absolute value) and imprecisely
estimated coefficients in all of the several specifications that we tried. This suggests that
our assumptions A.9b) and A.9c) of no correlation are reasonable. The economic
significance of the no-correlation finding is tied to the interpretation of V().  As  we  will
elaborate in sections VI.B and VI.C, if one is willing to assume that V() captures social
surplus, it will most likely consist of domestic spillovers between firms in Finland. Under
such an assumption, the finding implies that project specific spillover shocks are unrelated
to project specific profitability shocks.
each equation. The second order terms were excluded from the screening equations and the Tekes decision
rule based on the LR-tests.
30 Naturally, the probit was run without the expected subsidy term, but with and without added interactions to
improve identification.
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We also tested our assumption that V(), the agency specific utility, is linear in applicant
investment. Were V() non-linear in the applicant’s investment, the Tekes decision rule
would contain an investment term (R) or its interactions with observable applicant
characteristics. After incorporating such terms into the Tekes decision rule, we could not
reject the Null of (joint) insignificance of the terms. Again, the economic implications are
tied to V().  Assuming  that V() is mostly a measure of spillovers, the result suggests that
project level spillovers are linear in R&D.
We  also  estimated  the  Tekes  decision  rule  by  a  two-limit  version  of  Powell’s  (1984)
CLAD estimator.31 This allows for nonparametric estimation of (two-limit) censored
regressions. As column two of Table 4 shows, the results are relatively close to those
obtained using Tobit ML. The only noteworthy differences are that with CLAD, the rubber
industry obtains a significant positive coefficient (approximately 0.008 in value, compared
with 0.012 for Tobit), and the coefficient of Central Finland is no more significant. There
are some relatively large differences between the insignificant coefficients, though.
Finally, to test whether measuring the subsidy per cent by summing subsidies, low-
interest  loans  and  capital  loans  affect  the  results,  we  estimated  the  two-limit  Tobit  using
only subsidies, excluding the loans. Column three reveals that our results are not driven by
our definition of the dependent variable.32
B. Cost of application function
In Table 5 we report the estimates of the application cost function (equation (14)).33 In
view of the received R&D literature, it is not surprising that only a few firm characteristics
31 The two-limit CLAD was estimated by using the following algorithm: we first estimated a LAD using all
379 observations, then excluded all observations with predicted values less than the minimum or more than
the maximum allowed, and re-estimated the LAD. This was repeated until convergence.
32 We also checked whether the definition of the dependent variable in the Tekes decision rule affects our
parameter estimates in the sample selection model (application and R&D investment). The R&D investment
equations’ parameters are virtually identical, as are most of the parameters of the application equation. All
parameters in the application equation are within one standard deviation of each other.
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significantly  affect  R&D  related  costs.  Age,  size,  board  size,  SME  status,  CEO  being
chairman, and parent company status have no statistically significant effect. Sales per
employee increase application costs. One interpretation is that firms producing high value
added products have complicated R&D projects based on soft information that are
laborious to write down. Another is that because the opportunity costs of the effort of
making and promoting an application are probably far greater than the direct monetary
costs of filling in and filing it, firms with high value current production have higher
opportunity costs of applying. Exporters have lower costs, maybe because they are
relatively more experienced in dealing with government bureaucracy than non-exporting
firms.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
The number of past applications has a nonlinear effect, first decreasing and then, after
141 applications, increasing application costs. Increasing the number of past applications
from non-applicants’ median of zero to applicants’ median of two decreases application
costs by 35%. One prior application decreases costs by 20% and four by 58%. It seems that
learning by doing is going on. Given that our data is cross sectional, however, it is possible
that instead of being attributed to path-dependence, the results are generated by unobserved
heterogeneity.
C. Investment equation
Recall that our investment equation (10’) identifies the effects of exogenous variables on
marginal  profitability  of  log  R&D.  As  in  the  case  of  the  application  cost  function,  it  is
likely that unobserved heterogeneity accounts for a substantial part of the marginal
profitability of R&D. This is also what we find, as Table 6 shows. In column one we report
the results from the specification with the quadratic terms. Only two reported variables
33 We only present results from the model where the log of accepted proposed investment was the dependent
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carry a significant coefficient: firms with higher value-added current production have
higher marginal profitability of R&D whereas it is lower in firms with CEOs as chairmen.34
In the specification without the quadratic terms, sales per employee and the CEO as
chairman continue to carry significant coefficients. In addition, we find that larger firms,
measured by the log of the number of employees, have higher marginal profitability of
R&D. Henderson and Cockburn (1996), the only other study known to us that employs
project level data, report a similar result.
To test the robustness of our results, we estimated the model using DNV’s semi-
parametric sample selection estimator. We imposed otherwise the structure of the ML
specification, but allowed the additively separable error terms to have unknown
distributions.  The  results,  presented  in  column  three  of  Table  6,  are  in  line  with  the  ML
estimates: Most coefficients are within the ML 95% confidence intervals. This suggests
that our ML distributional assumptions are not biasing the parameter estimates. The
propensity score carries a negative coefficient as expected (significant at 12.5% level).
Following DNV we interpret that there is evidence in favor of normal disturbances,
because cross-validation (CV) suggests that no higher order terms of the propensity score
are needed. 35
[TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE]
variable  in  the  2nd stage investment equation as results using the log of proposed investment yielded
essentially identical results.
34 Several industry and region dummies carried significant coefficients, too.
35 We used the same trimming and transformation DNV. The transformation gives exact sample selection
correction for Gaussian disturbances. The trimming explains the difference in the sample size compared to
ML estimations. We tried up to the 4th order terms for the variable capturing the effect of subsidies on
expected discounted profits in the 1st stage, and started from the ML specification. CV indicated that we
should include the subsidy-terms up to the 3rd order, but should not include interactions of the other
explanatory variables. In the 2nd stage, we kept the same specification as in ML, and experimented with
including up to the 4th order transformation of the propensity score (without interactions with explanatory
variables). Only the 1st order propensity score variable obtained a significant coefficient, and CV confirmed
that we only should use the 1st order propensity score. CV-values are reported in the Appendix. We used a
Gram-Schmidt ortho-normalization for the 3rd and 4th order terms in both stages.
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Finally, we estimated the investment equation using the R&D investment proposed by
the applicant as an alternative dependent variable. The results, presented in column four,
are close to those in column one.36 The one notable difference is that the coefficient of the
CEO as chairman variable, although close in value, is no longer statistically significant. It
thus seems that the definition of the dependent variable is not driving the results.
D. Covariance structure
As Table 7 shows, we are able to identify the variances of all error terms, and the
covariance between the unobservables in the selection and investment equations. The
coefficient determining the variance share of the unobservable of the investment equation
in the unobservable of the application cost function (equation (14)) obtains a value of 1.5.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the unobserved marginal profitability of the R&D project of a
firm, the less likely it is that the firm will submit an application. Similar to the finding that
sales per employee increase application costs, it could be that projects with higher marginal
profitability of R&D are more complicated involving tacit knowledge and are therefore
more difficult to describe in an application. Moreover, the application costs are essentially
opportunity costs, which should be higher for projects with higher marginal profitability of
R&D.
VI. Implications of the results
The structure of our model can be utilized to back out a number of figures, some of which
are reported here. We first report implications about profitability and application costs and
then our findings on treatment effects and rates of return. We conclude by characterizing
the distribution of R&D benefits. A key idea is to exploit the information on unobservables
that the covariance structure and the selection equation yield besides the estimated
36 The results using the restricted specification are close to those reported in column two.
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parameters. Since the indicator function in (6’’) takes value one for applicants and zero for
non-applicants, we can calculate the expected values of the unobservables conditional on
the  value  of  the  indicator  function.  In  our  calculations  we  use  the  results  both  with  the
accepted proposed investment and proposed investment as the dependent variables
(columns one and four of Table 6).37 The implications obtained by using the proposed
investment are reported in the second column of Tables 8 and 9. We report medians.
A. Marginal profitability and application costs
Non-applicants’ expected marginal profitability of log R&D is four times higher than
applicants’. This is due to the positive correlation of the marginal profitability and
application cost shocks: Applicants have smaller shocks and therefore lower profitability.
The difference between the median marginal profitability expected by non-applicants and
applicants is much smaller, if the application decision is not used to obtain information on
the unobservable application costs. Similarly, the expected discounted profits on the non-
applicants' projects are 2.5 [5.5 with the proposed R&D investment as the dependent
variable] million euros whereas they are only 0.5 [0.7] million euros on the applicants’
projects. Applicants also have considerably smaller median costs of application (7 700 [11
100]) than non-applicants (330 000 [1 570 000] euros). This, too, is generated by the
positive correlation between the marginal profitability and application cost shocks. We find
that the applicants’ projects generate an agency specific median expected discounted utility
(w/o subsidies) of 18 000 [25 000], the corresponding utility from non-applicants' projects
being 71 000 [152 000].38 Applicant’s profits are thus privately and socially less valuable
than those of non-applicants. However, the ratio of agency specific to private median
benefits is somewhat higher for applicants than non-applicants.
37 Using the results from column two of Table 6 (the specification without quadratic terms of explanatory
variables) made no essential difference.
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[TABLE 8 HERE]
B. Treatment effects
The literature on treatment effects emphasizes the effects of the treatment on potential
applicants.  In  our  case  the  effect  of  the  subsidy  is  included  in  (6’’),  which  shows how it
differs from the standard treatment effect by taking into account the cost of applying. The
expected treatment effect in our model is heterogenous as both observable and
unobservable applicant characteristics affect the marginal profitability of investment and
the cost of applying.
Our model suggests that a subsidy has effects on the agency beyond those on the
applicant. Furthermore, if one assumes that the agency is a benevolent social planner, V()
will capture all general equilibrium effects of a treatment outside those appropriated by the
applicant, and consequently the joint effect of the treatment on the agency and the applicant
will constitute the social treatment effect.
We  report  gross  and  net  treatment  effects  in  Table  9,  where  the  former  refers  to  the
standard calculation that does not take into account application costs. We further divide the
treatment effects into private (firm), agency, and joint treatment effects, where the private
gross treatment effect (on the treated) is the usually calculated one, agency treatment
effects are the change in the agency specific utility caused by the treatment, and joint refers
to  the  sum  of  private  and  agency  treatment  effects.  Finally,  we  differentiate  the  results
between the subsidy level expected prior to application (expected treatment effect) and the
subsidy level granted by the agency (actual treatment effect)39 Thus, the increase in
expected discounted gross and net profits due to expected and actual subsidy are the
expected and actual private gross and net treatment effects. The increase in the agency
38 The calculations are based on the assumption that the shadow cost of taxes, g, is 1.2. Kuismanen (2000)
estimates the dead-weight loss of existing Finnish taxation to be 15% using labor supply models. Both the
constant of integration and the fixed costs of screening applications (i.e., Fi=Ki) are ignored.
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specific  expected  discounted  utility  from  subsidies  is  the  (gross)  treatment  effect  on  the
agency. Similarly, the increases in gross and net expected discounted joint welfare due to
subsidies are the joint gross and net treatment effects.
The expected subsidies increase the applicants’ median profits gross of application
costs substantially less than the non-applicants’ gross profits (12 000 [17 000] euros vs. 46
000 [99 000] euros). A comparison of the figures with the private benefits without
subsidies, however, shows that the relative increase is much higher for applicants than non-
applicants. Subsidies increase the applicants’ expected discounted net profits by 3 000 [5
000] euros, whereas the actual subsidies increase them by 4 000 [7 000] euros. Using
expected subsidies, applicants’ and non-applicants’ projects yield almost the same median
increase in the agency specific utility (16 000 [17 000] and 13 000 [15 000] euros). The
median joint gross (net) treatment effect (welfare increase) is 30 000 [36 000] (21 000 [23
000]) euros for applicants using expected subsidies.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
The estimated private returns are very high for applicants (median close to 900%
[1000%]), and even higher for non-applicants. Joint returns are appreciably higher, but the
differences are dominated by the very high private returns. The private returns may seem
too high for comfort even keeping in mind that these figures are based on entrepreneurs’
and firms’ plans rather than on realizations, but most of the prior literature’s results also
indicate very high returns.  For example,  Griliches (1964) estimates a social  return of 13$
on a dollar of R&D in agriculture, Mansfield et al. (1977) report an average social rate of
return of over 80% and Griliches (1998, pp. 67) reports private rates of return in the
interval [.03, 1.03]. The relative dominance of private returns is understandable, because
Tekes and the firms operate in a small open economy from which most of the consumer
39 In other words, actual means that the treatment is realized. Naturally, these are still expected discounted
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surplus and spillovers flow abroad.40 If Tekes is maximizing domestic welfare, it should
ignore those effects, implying that private returns constitute a large part of joint returns.
The distribution of private and, hence, joint returns to R&D, is skewed for non-applicants
(see Figure 1), confirming earlier results (Pakes 1986, Scherer and Harhoff 2000).
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Finally, we have calculated joint rates of return on subsidies (that on actual subsidies
can only be calculated for applicants).41 The median gross and net joint rate of returns on
the actual subsidy for applicants are 1.15 [1.14] and 0.79 [0.78]. The corresponding figures
on the expected subsidy are 2.57 [2.22] and 1.72 [1.46] for applicants. For non-applicants,
the median gross return on the expected subsidy is 1.28 [1.14]. The joint rate of return on
the subsidy program is 9%, ignoring the opportunity cost of taxes. Returns using actual
subsidies are lower because some firms get zero subsidies (no applicant expects to get
zero), and some who would have generated very high returns if they had received expected
subsidies, received lower subsidies and therefore generate lower returns.
The  private  and,  therefore,  joint  treatment  effects,  conditional  on  expected  subsidies,
are substantially lower for applicants, while the agency treatment effects and joint rates of
return are similar for applicants and non-applicants. The reason why applicants’ projects
are submitted to Tekes is that they involve much lower application costs than the projects
that are not submitted. Some privately and jointly profitable projects have very high private
opportunity costs of applying. The results suggest that the average joint rate of return could
be much higher if the positive correlation between application costs and marginal
effects.
40 The  literature  on  R&D,  geography  and  trade  (see  e.g.  Eaton  and  Kortum  2002)  finds  that  much  of  the
spillovers are international.
41 The joint rate of return is defined as the sum of agency specific utility and firm profits divided by subsidy
amount in euros, where the subsidy amount in euros equals subsidy times the expected R&D investment,
conditional on the subsidy.
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profitability could be lowered, because then society would reap the large increases in
private treatment effects.
C. Distribution of benefits
In the following we assume that V()  reflects  benefits  to  the  Finnish  society  that  are  not
appropriated by the firm.  It is of course questionable whether Tekes’ decisions reflect
social  benefits  or  not.  However,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  let  us  proceed  under  that
assumption. As mentioned, even if this is the case, V() does not measure the global social
surplus:  it  is  very  likely  that  most  of  the  consumer  surplus  and  at  least  some  of  the
spillovers stemming from Finnish innovations will diffuse outside Finland. Therefore, we
can think that V() mainly consist of domestic technological spillovers. This interpretation is
supported by our observation that technical challenge ratings gain a significant role in the
Tekes decision rule.
We first discuss how agency specific benefits vary with R&D investments. This
immediately yields the variation of the agency specific benefits with subsidies, given the
complementarity of the investment and subsidy levels in our model. We then describe and
characterize the joint distribution of private and agency specific expected discounted
benefits from R&D. Much of the growth literature assumes that spillovers are increasing in
R&D: Studying the distribution of agency specific benefits allows us to test this assumption
in  our  data.  The  joint  distribution  in  turn  is  central  in  uncovering  whether  the  social
benefits of R&D grow in proportion to private benefits or not.
Recall that we can estimate the expected discounted profits from a firm's R&D
project conditional on its decision to apply for a subsidy (E[?()|X, apply or not]), and the
agency specific expected discounted utility from the project (E[V]=E[ d?Z ]E[R]),  up  to  a
constant. Because we cannot identify the constant in E[ d?Z ], we cannot scale the values for
E[V()], but this does not otherwise affect our ability to characterize the joint distribution.
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As before, in calculating E[ d?Z ], we set g=1.2 and Fi=Ki. Such assumptions yield -0.14 as
an  estimate  of  the  constant.  Using  this  value,  E[ d?Z ] is nonnegative for 97% of our
observations: Figure 2 depicts the distribution of E[ d?Z ].  This  implies  that  E[V()] is
increasing in R&D investments and, hence, in the subsidy rate, for almost all projects in
our data. The figure also reveals that for most projects, the expected increase in spillovers
is between 0 and 0.2 per one euro of R&D. Moreover, because we used only observations
below the 99th percentile for Figure 2, it is apparent that for 99% of firms, a one euro
increase in R&D leads to a less than 0.4 euro increase in spillovers.
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE]
Figure 3 presents the joint distribution of private and agency specific benefits, and a
non-parametric estimate of E[V()]  as  a  function  of  E[?()|X,  apply  or  not]. 42 Regressing
E[V()] on E[?()|X, apply or not] and a constant yields a coefficient of  .00001, significant at
the  0.1%  level,  while  the  raw  correlation  is  .041,  significant  at  the  1%  level,  but  the
estimated nonparametric relationship between the agency specific and private benefits is
non-monotone. It is increasing in intermediate values of private benefits, but for low and
high values, the estimated relationship has a negative slope. Thus, R&D projects with
larger private benefits do not necessarily yield larger spillovers.
VII. Conclusions
We outline a new approach to characterize the determinants and the distribution of R&D
benefits and to gain understanding of how an R&D subsidy program works. The method
exploits a structural model of a treatment program and data at the firm and R&D project
level. We find that unlike what is routinely assumed in the literature, our measures of
spillovers and private benefits are not monotonically related. Specifically, we find that
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spillover and profitability shocks are unrelated. Spillovers are however linear in R&D
investments. The benefits appropriated by the agency but not by the firm conducting the
R&D are dominated by private benefits. Both private and social rates of return are large
and their distribution skew. Large firms have higher marginal returns to R&D, and their
projects yield higher agency specific returns. Profitability and application cost shocks are
positively related, implying that firms do not apply for subsidies for the privately most
profitable projects. Our results suggest that ignoring application costs is recommendable
neither in the research of R&D subsidy treatment effects nor in practical policy making, as
it leads to an upward bias of the order of 70-90 percentage points.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Age, years 12.320 9.3453 1 97
# Employees 35.229 257.174 1 13451
Sales/employee,
1000 euros
164.920 2156.96
1
0 206875.5
Exporter 0.063 .244 0 1
SME 0.975 .157 0 1
CEO is chairman
of board 0.141 .348
0 1
Board size 4.350 2.003 1 10
# past Tekes
applications
0.575 3.488 0 146
Applicant 0.084 .277 0 1
NOTES: There are 10944 observations. Data sources: Asiakastieto Ltd. otherwise; for
data on applications, Tekes.
Table 2
Conditional Descriptive Statistics
Non-
Applicants
Applica
nts
Rejected
Applicants
Successful
Applicant
s
Age 12.355
(9.326)
[10]
11.940
(9.557)
[10]
11.777
(9.964)
[9]
11.983
(9.452)
[10]
# Employees 21.200
(122.28
2)
[5]
189.001
(775.86
2)
[26]
101.269
(187.503)
[21]
212.453
(866.674)
[27]
Sales/employee 168.852
(2252.6
92)
[77.55]
121.826
(54.996
)
[89.72]
104.831
(94.238)
[82.95]
126.369
(167.307)
[91.58]
Exporter 0.059
(0.236)
0.109
(0.312)
0.119
(0.325)
0.107
(0.309)
SME 0.9860
(0.1173)
0.850
(0.357)
0.855
(0.352)
0.849
(0.358)
CEO is chairman
of board
0.141
(0.348)
0.149
(0.356)
0.176
(0.382)
0.141
(0.349)
Board size 4.183
(1.873)
[4]
6.177
(2.431)
[6]
5.850
(2.285)
[5]
6.265
(2.462)
[6]
# past Tekes
applications
0.247
(1.283)
[0]
4.163
(10.657
)
[2]
3.228
(10.933)
[1]
4.413
(10.576)
[2]
Nobs. 10029 915 193 722
NOTES: Number reported are mean, (standard deviation), and for other than [0,1]
variables, [median]. Data sources: Asiakastieto Ltd. otherwise; for data on
applications, Tekes.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Tekes and Application Variables
All
Applicants
Successful
Applicants
Rejected
Applicants
Applied amount,
euros
634294
(1254977)
700378.2
(1363460)
385790
(657539.8)
Applied for
subsidy only
0.591
(0.492)
0.482
(0.500)
1.000
(0.000)
Technical
challenge
2.088
(0.982)
{582}
2.312
(0.872)
{426}
1.474
(1.006)
{156}
Risk 2.189
(0.937)
{422}
2.150
(0.925)
{326}
2.302
(0.937)
{96}
Granted subsidy
rate
- 0.316
(0.126)
-
Granted subsidy
only
- 0.839
(0.600)
-
Nobs. 915 722 193
NOTES: Datasource: Tekes. Reported numbers are mean, standard deviation, and
{nobs}, the last in case it deviates from that reported on the last row.
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Table 4
Tekes Decision Rule Results
Variable (1)
ML
Dep. var. subsidy-
intensity (all finance)
(2)
CLAD
Dep. var. subsidy-
intensity. (all finance)
(3)
ML
Dep. var. subsidy-
intensity (subsidies only)
Risk -.018
[-.041    .005]
-.020**
[-.039   -.001]
-.019
[-.048    .009]
Technical
challenge
.100***
[.076    .124]
.094***
[.074    .113]
.120**
[.090    .150]
Age -.001
[-.003     .001]
.0003
[-.0017    .0023]
-.001
[-.004    .002]
Log
employment
.0164*
[-.003    .036]
.024***
[.008    .040]
.031***
[.007    .055]
Sales /
employment
.000036
[-.000136    .000276]
.000034
[-.000083    .000151]
.000036
[-.00017    .000243]
SME .085**
[-.001    .170]
.068*
[-.003    .138]
.093*
[-.011    .197]
Parent company .006
[-.040    .053]
.016
[-.023    .055]
.014
[-.043    .070]
# previous
applications
-.001
[-.006    .004]
-.002
[-.006    .002]
-.003
[-.009     .003]
CEO also
chairman
.001
[-.053   .055]
-.018
[-.064    .028]
-.013
[-.080    .055]
Board size -.007
[-.017    .003]
-.0001
[-.0084    .0082]
-.009
[-.021    .003]
Exporter -.042
[-.107     .023]
-.016
[-.069    .038]
-.079*
[-.161    .002]
Constant -.060
[-.217    .098]
-.103
[-.233    .028]
-.197**
[-.393   -.001]
hs .189***[.173    .206]
- .225***
[.203    .247]
Nobs. 379 379 379
LogL. -18.636 - -91.763
Wald 0.000 - 0.000
Linearity 1 0.690 - -
Linearity 2 0.313 - -
Sample sel. .068
(.051)
- -
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Wald is the p-value of a Wald test of joint significance of all RHS
variables. All specifications include industry and region dummies.
Linearity 1 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the equation.
Linearity 2 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the equation, plus interactions between it and age, log
employment, and sales/employee.
Sample sel. =  coeff. and (s.e.) of the Mills ratio term when the 1(apply) specification same as in Table 5.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the proportion of expenses that the Agency covers, defined as the sum of all three types of
financing the Agency grants (in euros, see main text) divided by accepted proposed investment. In column (3), the dependent variable is the
subsidy (in euros) divided by the accepted proposed investment.
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Table 5
Application Cost Function Results
Variable Value
Age .013
[-.019   .273]
Age sq. -7.375e-06
[-.004    .0004]
Log of employment -.381
[-3.884    .125]
Ln(emp) sq. .050
[-.015    .418]
Sales/employee .002**
[.0004   .015]
Sales/emp. Sq. -1.986e-07
[-8.84e-07   1.61e-06]
SME .236
[-.609   3.750]
Parent company -.127
[-2.488    .226]
# Previous applications -.221**
[-3.877    -.019]
# Prev appl. sq. .002**
[.0002   .028]
CEO is chairman -.326
[-1.308   .222]
Board size -.101
[-1.406   .028]
Exporter -.736**
[-6.685   -.029]
Constant 11.830***
[10.404   14.638]
Nobs 10751
LogL. -18.636
Wald (d.f. 29) 0.000
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Statistics refer to the probit
1st stage regression from the results of which the cost function coefficients have been backed out.
Confidence intervals are estimated using a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. The specification includes
industry and regional dummies.
Wald is the p-value of the joint significance of all explanatory variables in the probit 1st stage
regression.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
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Table 6
R&D Investment Function Results
Variable (1)
ML
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(2)
ML
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(3)
DNV
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(4)
ML
Dep. var. proposed
investment
Age -.005
[-.027   .008]
.002
[-.005   .006]
.0001
[-.030  .025]
-.005
[ -.029   .006  ]
Age sq. .0002
[-.00003   .0005]
- .0002
[-.0002   .0005]
.0001
[-.00007   .0004]
Log of
employment
-.077
[-.191  .234]
.042**
[.012   .134]
-.024
[-.362   .327]
-.130
[-.290   .203]
Ln(emp) sq. .015
[-.022   .030]
- -.001
[-.039   .036]
.022
[-.017   .043]
Sales/
employee
.001***
[.0001     .002]
0.0008***
[.0006   .001]
.001**
[.0003   .003]
.001*
[-.0002   .002]
Sales/emp.
sq.
-1.95e-07
[-7.31e-07 1.29e-06]
- -2.9e-07
[-1.01e-06 1.33e-06]
-1.53e-07
[-6.10e-07 1.58e-06]
SME -.258
[-.561    .202]
-.281
[-.434   .011]
-.011
[-.766   .815]
-.063
[-.500   .350]
Parent
company
.020
[-.134   .262]
.066
[-.026   .210]
-.091
[-.438   .236]
-.035
[-.186   .173]
# Previous
applications
-.047
[-.061   .020]
-.006
[-.012  .001]
-.295
[-.748  .174]
-.047
[-.069   .004]
# Prev appl.
sq.
.0003
[-.0003   .0005]
- .002
[-.005   .011]
.0003
[-.0001   .0006]
CEO is
chairman
-.182*
[-.362    .003]
-.198**
[-.336   -.069]
-.158
[-.368   .066]
-.107
[-.278   .080]
Board size -.008
[-.031    .049]
.008
[-.005  .046]
-.065
[-.207   .086]
.007
[-.021   .066]
Exporter -.255
 [-.400    .037]
-.198
[-.301  .001]
-.398
[-.849   .162]
-.118
[-.280   .173]
Propensity
score
- - -13.363a
[-28.604   3.440]
-
Constant 13.234***
[10.920    13.638]
12.401***
[11.224  12.475]
- 13.002***
[10.965   13.428]
Nobs. 722 722 688 915
Wald (d.f. X) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(1- s ) 0.158
(0.181)
-0.718
(0.740)
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Confidence intervals are based on a bootstrap with 400
repetitions. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the log of accepted proposed investment: in column (4) it is the log of proposed
investment.
 Wald is the p-value of joint significance of RHS variables. The constant is not identified when using DNV.
 ln(1- s ) coefficient reports the coefficient and the (p-value) of a 2c -test of difference from unity. The SME dummy was excluded from
the test regressions due to collinearity with ln(1- s ).
***, **, *, and a denote significance at 1, 5, 10, and 15% level.
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Table 7
Covariance Structure Results
Variable Value
es
Standard deviation of the investment equation
shock
1.120***
[.834   1.256]
hs
Standard deviation of the Tekes specific utility
(=V()) shock
.189***
[.173    .206]
0us
Standard deviation of the uncorrelated part of the
application cost function shock
.456***
[.111   12.552]
r
Measure of the variance share of e  in u
1.485***
[1.052   11.010]
eur
Correlation between e  and the application
equation error term
-.766***
[-.879   -.153]
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. For all but hs , these are
based on a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. For hs , it is based on the estimated covariance matrix.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
Table 8
Implications of the Model, I
Entity (1)
Dep. var. log of
accepted proposed
investment
(2)
Dep. var. log of
proposed investment
Expected marginal profitability of log R&D, applicants 45228.72 62708.76
Same for non-applicants 199844.4 427592.4
Expected discounted profits from R&D w/o subsidies, euros,
applicants
487485.9 673571.1
Same for non-applicants 2455946 5487330
Tekes specific expected discounted utility (=V()) from the
projects w/o subsidies, euros, applicants
17611.46 25183.04
Expected application cost, euros, applicants 7657.862 11106.59
Same for non-applicants 326129.1 1567572
NOTES: Reported numbers are medians. Gross (Net) profits refers to gross (net) of application costs.  The figures are calculated assuming g
= 1.2 ( g= shadow cost of public funds).
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Table 9
Implications of the Model, II
Entity (1)
Dep. var. log of
accepted proposed
investment
(2)
Dep. var. log of
proposed investment
Increase expected discounted gross profits due to expected
subsidies, euros, applicants
12000.34 17231.23
Same for non-applicants 45882.42 98874.66
Increase in expected discounted net profits due to expected
subsidies, euros, applicants
3208.659 5174.192
Increase in expected discounted net profits due to actual
subsidies, euros, applicants
4217.539 6857.951
Increase in expected discounted Tekes specific utility (=V())
from granting the expected subsidy, euros, applicants
15688.89 16820.58
Same for non-applicants 13181.76 14913.33
Increase in expected discounted joint gross welfare due to
expected subsidies, euros, applicants
29740.05 35917.49
Increase in expected discounted joint net welfare due to
expected subsidies, euros, applicants
20870.01 23129.74
Private rate of return on R&D w/o subsidies, applicants 9.719 10.739
Same for non-applicants 11.205 12.837
Joint rate of return on R&D w/o subsidies, applicants 12.547 12.151
Same for non-applicants 12.651 13.012
Joint rate of return on expected subsidies, gross, applicants 2.568 2.222
Joint rate of return on expected subsidies, gross, non-
applicants
1.286 1.154
Joint rate of return on actual subsidies, gross, applicants 1.153 1.140
Joint rate of return on expected subsidies, net, applicants 1.716 1.459
Joint rate of return on actual subsidies, net, applicants .785 .778
NOTES: Reported numbers are medians. Gross (Net) profits refers to gross (net) of application costs.  The figures are calculated assuming g =
1.2 ( g= shadow cost of public funds). Non-applicant application costs do not include unobservables, and are hence downward biased.
Figure 1: Private expected rates of return to R&D w/o subsidies, non-applicants
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Figure 3: Joint distribution of expected discounted private and joint benefits from R&D w/o
subsidies, all firms
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APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, we report the ordered probit estimation of the Tekes grading process;
descriptive statistics of a) the whole application sample b) the application sample who
have strictly positive accepted proposed investments, and c) the application sample for
which we observe grades in both evaluation dimensions; industry and region dummy
descriptive  statistics  and  their  coefficients  for  the  estimated  equations;  and  the  cross-
validation figures for the 1st and 2nd stage DNV estimations.
We have different applicant samples in the estimations of the two grading
dimensions,  because  sometimes  we  only  observe  one  or  the  other  grade  for  an
application. During our observation period, Tekes did not uniformly store grading data
in their central database, from which our data has been collected. We use the estimation
results to create the probabilities of getting a particular grade for all the 10751 (10944)
observations in the estimation sample.
A.1. The evaluation equations
In  the  technical  challenge  estimation,  sales  per  employee,  number  of  previous
applications, board size, and industry dummies (chemical, industry, electric
engineering, data processing, and R&D services) increase the probability of getting a
high grade in evaluation of technical challenge. Having a CEO as chairman and being in
the food or paper industry decreases the probability of getting a high grade.
In the market risk estimation, sales per employee and a number of industry dummies
have a negative effect on the probability of obtaining a high risk rating (high meaning
higher  risk).  The  industry  dummies  that  carry  significant  negative  coefficients  are
paper, other manufacturing, and telecoms. Being located in Western Finland also
decreases the probability of being classified as high risk.
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Table A.1
Estimation of the Evaluation Equations
Variable Technical Challenge Risk
Age |   .003
[-.007     .013]
|  -.0042379
[-.0164625   .0079868]
Log Employees .008
[-.076    .092]
-.0536393
[-.1538962   .0466177]
Sales/employee .001***
[.0002    .002]
-.0008665*
[-.0017846   .0000516]
SME -.101
[-.476    .274]
|   .0600485
[-.3851782   .5052751]
Parent Company -.002
[ -.206    .202]
|  -.1378355
[-.3769572   .1012863]
# Previous Applications .021*
[ -.003    .044]
-.0189169
[-.045992   .0081582]
CEO is chairman |  -.247**
[-.487   -.006]
-.0118448
[-.2940517   .270362]
Board size .078
[.034    .121]
.0331881
[ -.0160126   .0823889]
Exporter |   .170
[-.114    .454]
.2292716
[-.1084814   .5670247]
Nobs. 582 422
LogL. -753.92882 -528.7958
Joint Significance 0.000 0.0000
NOTES: reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Joint Significance is the p-
value of a LR test of joint significance of all explanatory variables. Both specifications include industry
and region dummies.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
A.2. Descriptive statistics of the applicant samples
Table A.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the three samples of applicants
mentioned above. As can be seen, the differences are minor; judging on observables, we
are unlikely to have a selection problem among applicants in the subsidy equation. The
only potentially worrisome difference is that in the smallest sample, the mean number
of previous application is lower (2.8) than in the other two (4.2 and 4.4). The standard
error also declines. Also, the proportion of telecom firms and firms in Eastern Finland
are somewhat lower. As we report in the main text, we found no evidence for sample
selection after testing it against the whole sample.
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Table A.2
Descriptive Statistics of Different Applicant Samples
Variable All Applicants Applicants with
strictly positive
proposed accepted
investment
Applicants for whom
grades in both evaluation
dimensions are observed
Age 11.940
( 9.557)
11.983
(9.452)
11.425
(8.961)
Log Employees 3.416
(1.787)
3.469
(1.786)
3.213
(1.684)
Sales/employee 121.826
(154.996)
126.369
(167.307)
120.252
(128.096)
SME .850
(.357)
.849
(.358)
.879
(.327)
Parent company .510
(.500)
.525
(.500)
.478
(.500)
# Previous
applications
4.163
(10.657)
4.413
(10.576)
2.765
(4.545)
CEO is chairman .149
(.356)
.141
(.349)
.174
( .380)
Board size 6.177
(2.431)
6.265
(2.462)
6.090
(2.367)
Exporter .109
(.312)
.107
( .309)
.116
(.321)
Food .035
( .184)
.037
(190)
.032
(.175)
Paper .051
(.221)
.051
(.221)
.037
(.189)
Chemicals .032
(.175)
.035
(.183)
.026
(.160)
Rubber .062
(.242)
.061
(.239)
.061
(.239)
Metals .079
(.269)
.080
(.272)
.069
(.253)
Electric .101
(.301)
.108
(.311)
.106
(.308)
Radio and TV .040
(.197)
.039
(.193)
.047
( .213)
Other
manufacturing
.093
(.290)
.091
(.288)
.087
(.282)
Telecoms .009
(.093)
.010
(.098)
.003
(.051)
Data processing .207
(.405)
.197
(.398)
.259
(.438)
R&D .148
(.355)
.147
(.354)
.129
( .336)
Western Finland .321
( .467)
.321
(.467)
.351
(.478)
Eastern Finland .115
(.319)
.125
(.331)
.058
(.234)
Central Finland/
Oulu region
.085
(.279)
.079
(.270)
.087
(.282)
Northern Finland /
Lapland region
.022
(.146)
.019
(.138)
.029
(.168)
Nobs. 915 722 379
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A.3. Descriptive statistics of the industry and region dummies for the whole sample
Table A.3
Descriptive Statistics of the Industry and Region Dummies for the Sample
Indicator Mean (s.d.)
Agriculture .0001
(.010)
Food .045
( .207)
Paper .061
(.239)
Chemicals .015
(.120)
Rubber .056
(.229)
Metals .139
(.346)
Electric .046
(.209)
Radio and TV .015
(.120)
Other manufacturing .188
(.391)
Telecoms .009
(.095)
Data processing .105
(.307)
R&D .196
(.397)
Southern Finland .453
(.498)
Western Finland .386
(.487)
Eastern Finland .078
(.268)
Central Finland/Oulu region .061
(.240)
Northern Finland/Lapland .023
(.149)
NOTES: there are 10944 observations.
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A.4. Coefficients of industry and region dummies
Table A.4
Estimated Industry and Region Dummy Parameters
Variable  Tekes Decision Rule
Table 4
Application Cost
Function
Table 5
 R&D Investment Function
Table 6
Column (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Food .246***
[.122 .370]
.241***
[.137  .345]
.312***
[.163 .461]
.325
[-.965   13.121]
-.524***
[-.987   -.240]
-.606***
[-1.00   -.269]
-.518*
[-.968   .025]
-.522***
[-.904   -.179]
Paper -.017
[-.140 .106]
.018
[-.080 .116]
.0003
[-.1488  .1494]
.085
[-1.169   1.913]
.183
[-.335   .361]
.013
[-.349   .343]
.144
[-.395    .808]
.183
[-.208    .525]
Chemicals .094
[-.039 .228]
.052
[-.060  .164]
.132
[.029 .292]
.979
[-.318   12.204]
.163
[-.196   .789]
.267
[-.170   .753]
.232
[-.573   .889]
.163
[-.413  .723]
Rubber .012
[-.084 .108]
.080
[-.002  .162]
.008*
[-.111 .126]
.228
[-.662   2.052]
.080
[-.195   .434]
.099
[-.213   .407]
.109
[-.214    .542]
.080
[-.267    .441]
Metals .004
[-.089   .095]
.013
[-.063    .089]
-.014
[-.128 .100]
.369a
[-.217   2.842]
.404
[-.0416   .512]
.231
[-.067   .472]
.289
[-.127   .708]
.403**
[.012   .658]
Electric -.046
[-.128 .036]
-.006
[-.076 .063]
-.052
[-.153 .050]
-.192
[-3.618  .597]
.254
[-.066   .541]
.167
[-.030   .540]
-.078
[-.678    .593]
.254**
[.019   .648]
Radio and TV -.029
[-.137  .078]
.011
[-.077 .100]
-.001
[-.131 .128]
.473
[-3.211   1.477]
.603***
[.238   1.184]
.621***
[.247   1.183]
.486*
[-.066    1.287]
.603**
[.082   1.197]
Other manufacturing -.019
[-.107 .069]
.013
[-.060 .086]
-.016
[-.123 .092]
.281
[-.574   3.803]
.206
[-.353   .267]
-.050
[-.379   .217]
.0002
[-.391   .460]
.205
[-.201    .472]
Telecoms - - - 1.056a
[-.154   5.572]
.602
[-.053    1.200]
.514
[-.084   1.08]
.888*
[-.221  2.095]
.602
[-.111    1.188]
Data processing -.066*
[-.140 .008]
-.028
[-.090 .033]
-.058
[-.150 .034]
-.432
[-5.276   .360]
.209
[-.0797   .475]
.172
[-.029   .484]
-.199
[-.917   .552]
.210**
[.017 .585]
R&D .007
[-.073    .087]
.049
[-.018 .117]
.024
[-.075 .122]
.178
[-.353   3.593]
.096
[-.301   .243]
-.075
[-.286   .229]
-.071
[-.353   .251]
.096
[-.178    .377]
Western Finland .018
[-.028   .064]
.026
[-.012  .065]
.019
[-.038 .075]
.362*
[-.022   2.083]
.235**
[.0164    .336]
.153**
[.012   .328]
.147*
[-.011  .321]
.236***
[.090   .424]
Eastern Finland .096**
[.007    .185]
.088**
[.014  .162]
.145***
[.037 .252]
-.196
[-.854   2.069]
-.462**
[-.603   -.039]
-.374**
[-.553   -.059]
-.539**
[-.980   -.030]
-.462***
[-.622   -.102]
Central Finland/Oulu
region
.069*
[-.006    .145]
.031
[-.030 .092]
.102**
[.010 .193]
.096
[-.595   1.049]
.062
[-.277   .272]
-.034
[-.246   .255]
-.175
[-.600    .242]
.062
[-.193   .372]
Northern Finland/Lapland -.031
[-.158    .095]
-.026
[-.121 .070]
-.014
[-.170 .142]
.168
[-2.891   1.272]
.096
[-.056   .710]
.281
[-.027   .715]
.245
[-.188   .702]
.096
[-.171   .507]
NOTES: in the Tekes decision rule equations, we excluded the telecommunications dummy because of problems in the bootstrap that were due to the low proportion of telecommunications firms in our sample of firms
with both Tekes evaluation grades. ***, **, *, and a  denote significance at 1, 5, 10, and 15% level. Southern Finland is our base region.
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A.5. Cross-validation
In the Table below, we present the cross-validation figures for the application and the
investment equations. Cross-validation figures were calculated using equation (2.22) in
Yatchew (1998).
Table A.5
Cross-validation of the Application and R&D Investment Equations
Specification Application Equation R&D Investment Equation
Linear term 0.0595 0.7961
+2nd power 0.0602 0.7982
+2nd and 3rd  power 0.0586 0.8006
+2nd -4th  power 0.0635 0.8039
+ 2nd and 3rd powers and 1st
order interactions between
continuous variables
0.0982 -
Notes: the linear term is the effect of expected subsidies on expected discounted profits in the
application equation, and the propensity score transformation that DNV use (Mills ratio) in the R&D
investment equation.  The base specification is the same as in the ML estimations.
